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Abstract
We consider a general equilibrium economy with public goods and ex-
ternalities. Following Boyd and Conley (1997), we treat externality mar-
kets directly instead of indirectly through Arrovian commodities. Because
such direct externality markets are not subject to the nonconvexities that
Starrett (1972) shows are fundamental to Arrow’s externality markets, this
new approach admits the use of largely standard methods to prove wel-
fare and existence theorems in an economy with externalities. We extend
the Boyd and Conley model to allow firms to benefit from public goods
and be damaged by externalities, and to allow consumers to produce ex-
ternalities. We state a first welfare theorem and prove the existence of a
competitive equilibrium. Taken together, this can be viewed as a type of
general equilibrium Coase Theorem. Considered as a special case, these
theorems also represent a significant generalization of existing results for
pure public goods economies.
JEL Classification: H41, H23
Keywords: Externalities, Coase Theorem, Arrow commodities, pollu-
tion permits, property rights, Lindahl Equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Coase’s (1960) implied assertion that, if transaction costs are zero, any assign-
ment of property rights leads to an efficient outcome, has strong intuitive appeal.
But it is well-known that externalities can cause ordinary competitive markets to
fail. Arrow (1970) recognized that this failure arises from the incompleteness of
markets caused by the presence of externalities. To complete these markets, Arrow
extended the standard commodity space to include artificial commodities which
serve as proxies for externalities. The resulting economy can be transformed into
a special case of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie economy for which standard results
apply. Starrett (1972), however, demonstrated that Arrow’s method necessarily
introduces nonconvexities into the production sets. As a result, the existence and
second welfare theorems to which Arrow appeals depend on an assumption which
is logically inconsistent with Arrovian commodities. Unfortunately, game theoretic
and other non-price based studies of economies with externalities have also con-
cluded that equilibria are not necessarily efficient.1
Can the intuitive appeal of the Coase hypothesis and the apparently failed
attempts to provide a theoretical foundation for it be reconciled? Hurwicz (1995)
suggests that the truth of Coase’s hypothesis depends critically on the institutions
under which property rights are traded and on the type of equilibrium concept ap-
plied. In that spirit, Boyd and Conley (1997) suggest an alternative price-based ap-
proach to economies with externalities. They proposed that markets be completed
directly by distributing property rights for externality production itself, rather than
indirectly through artificial Arrovian commodities.2 The main advantage of this new
1 Papers in this spirit include Aivazian et al. (1987), Harrison and McKee (1980), and Hoffman et.
al. (1994), Hurwicz (1999) and Chari and Jones (2000). For a further discussion of these results,
see Boyd and Conley (1997).
2 This is similar to an example provided by Laffont (1988). He seemed to believe, however, that
such direct externality markets were still subject to Starrett’s fundamental nonconvexities. So it
is not completely clear what Laffont envisioned.
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approach is that properly bounding the endowment of externality property rights
frees the direct externality markets from the fundamental nonconvexities identified
by Starrett. Therefore, this new approach allows the use of largely standard meth-
ods to prove welfare theorems for economies with externalities. A second major
advantage to the direct market approach is that, unlike Arrovian markets, it pro-
vides proper incentives for the use of abatement and other externality avoidance
technologies.
The first economic contribution of this paper is to provide a significant gen-
eralization of Boyd and Conley (1997) in order to allow: 1) public goods to enter
into firms’ production sets;3 2) firms also to be affected by externalities (instead of
just consumers); and 3) consumers to produce externalities. While these seem like
natural features for an economy with externalities to possess, we are aware of no
general equilibrium treatment of an economy with these properties elsewhere in the
literature.
The second economic contribution of this paper is to prove for the first time
the existence of the competitive equilibrium introduced in Boyd and Conley (1997).
Combined with the first welfare theorem, these two theorems can be taken as a
general equilibrium Coase theorem.4 Of course, we are not the first to explore the
existence of equilibrium in public goods economies. The earliest work of which
we are aware is Foley (1970) who showed the existence of a generalized Lindahl
equilibrium by enlarging the commodity spaces and appealing to an existence result
from a private goods economy. Milleron (1972) considered a more general pure
public goods economy, and formalized Foley’s proof. Roberts (1973) and Khan and
3 Diamantaras and Wilkie (1994) also allow public goods to be inputs in production and show the
existence of ratio equilibrium for such an economy.
4 We do not address the stronger claim which has also come to be consider a Coase Theorem, namely
that the outcome is independent of the initial endowment of rights.
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Vohra (1985) extended Foley’s result to economies with a measure space of agents.
Khan and Vohra (1987) and Bonnisseau (1991) prove the existence of a Lindahl-
Hotelling equilibrium (MC or AC producer prices with Lindahl consumer prices) for
cases of increasing-returns-to-scale technology or general nonconvexities. However,
all of these existence results are for economies in which consumers do not contribute
to public good (or bad) levels, firms do not use public goods (or bads) as inputs,
or initial endowments of public goods are not considered. In this respect, the proof
provided here is the most general one of which we are aware.
The third contribution of this paper is technical. The generalizations descibed
above create several technical difficulties in proving the standard theorems. These
difficulties all root in the fact that firms both produce and consume public goods,
and that both consumers and firms benefit from abatement while they, themselves,
produce externalities. Our proof technique is inspired by Foley (1970) and if, like
Foley and others, we make a separation between the production and consumption
of public commodities, then Foley’s proofs could be applied almost directly. But
without that separation, the global production set is not the direct sum of firms’
production sets and care must taken to define the equilibrium concept in such a way
that the agents do not inefficiently internalize their public commodity production
choices. (For example, firms must believe that no connection exists between the
public goods they produce and the levels of public inputs they use). A greater
difficulty arises in defining artificial production, consumption, and socially prefered
sets so that the separating prices in the artificial economy support equilibrium and
efficient allocations in the real economy.
Unfortunately, these factors make the construction we propose somewhat com-
plex and we have, therefore, largely relegated it to the appendix. A more elegant
construction would certainly be desirable, but we have no promising leads on a
simpler approach. It would need to address the fact that the set of choice variables
for firms is larger than for consumers because they include both production and
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consumption of public goods while individuals are only consumers of public goods.
As a result, the public goods variable cannot be made to do double duty as in
Foley, and a different set of artificial commodities must be introduced which are of
no utility value to consumers. Interested readers who read the appendix will also
notice several other factors that prevent the direct application of Foley’s technique.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section two, we describe our model and
state a first welfare theorem. In section three, we prove the existence of a compet-
itive equilibrium by defining an associated economy which has a quasi-equilibrium
for which Debreu proved existence and then show this quasi-equilibrium corresponds
to an equilibrium of our original economy.
2. An Externality Rights Model
We consider a model with I individual consumers and F firms. We use the
convention I ≡ {1, . . . , I} for consumers, and F ≡ {I + 1, . . . , I + F} for firms.
Subscripts are used to represent firms and consumers and superscripts to represent
commodities. There are N c private commodities which include private goods and
bads.5 In addition there are Ng public goods, and Nr public externality rights. For
example, for externalities such as smoke, these externality rights are interpreted as
permission to generate a specified level of smoke.6
A typical consumption bundle will be denoted (xci , x
G
i , x
r
i , x
R
i ) where x
c
i ∈ <N
c
is a bundle of private commodities, xGi ∈ <N
g
is a bundle of public goods, xri ∈ <N
r
5 The directed externalities discussed in Boyd and Conley (1997) are a special case of a private bad.
6 These externality rights also admit interpretation as positive externalities. For example, for the
externality generated by planting trees, these public externality rights might be interpreted as
compensation vouchers “earned” by planting a specified number of trees. To be concrete in our
discussions, however, we will refer mainly to negative externalities such as smoke.
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is a bundle of privately used externality rights, and xRi ∈ <N
r
is a bundle of
publicly held externality rights (for example, abatement of public bads).7 Notice
that the last two components of a consumption bundle represent two different uses
of the same commodity: externality rights. It is key to this analysis to distinguish
between private uses and public uses of externality rights. We imagine an economy
in which each consumer derives benefits from his own private use of externality
rights, for example burning leaves in the fall, but is also harmed by the collective
private use of rights on the part of all consumers and firms. We capture this in the
consumption bundle by letting xri denote the private use of rights, and x
R
i denote
net level of publicly held rights which are not used and may therefore be thought
of as the total level of abatement. Thus, xRi is a kind of public good.
8 Each
agent i ∈ I is characterized by an endowment of private goods and externality
rights, ωi = (wci , 0, w
r
i , 0), and a preference relation ºi over the consumption set
Xi ⊂ <N
c+Ng+2Nr . The aggregate endowment is ω =
∑
i ωi = (
∑
i ω
c
i , 0,
∑
i ω
r
i , 0).
It is important to emphasize, however, that this externality rights endowment does
not predetermine the level of smoke in the economy. The fraction of rights that are
left unused and therefore become a public good called “abatement” is determined
endogenously through the market.
As noted by Boyd and Conley, it is both the structure of externality rights
and the boundedness of the externality rights endowment that differentiate this
model from Arrow’s model and allows us to escape the fundamental nonconvexities
described by Starrett (1972).9 It does not matter whether this bound is imposed
7 We use uppercase superscripts to denote public aspects of goods or prices in this model and
lowercase superscripts to denote private aspects. Furthermore, i and j will be used to denote
consumers and f and k will be used to denote firms.
8 It would also have been possible to put the total use of externality rights by the society into the
consumption bundle instead of it’s opposite, the total unused rights. We choose this approach
simply for notational convenience.
9 It is worth repeating a point from Boyd and Conley that merely bounding the Arrovian commodi-
ties is not sufficient for avoiding fundamental nonconvexities. Furthermore, bounding the rights
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by some human agency in the spirit of a pollution “benchmark,” or is the result of
physical natural limit on the possibilities to pollute.10 Cres (1996) also notices that
some sort of bounding of property rights is necessary for externality markets to work.
He formalizes a notion that appears in Starrett’s paper by proposing that agents be
given endowments of rights by setting a kind of status quo as a benchmark. Thus, for
example, agents might be entitled to the expectation that they work in a smoke free
environment. Any deviation from this standard would require a market exchange
of rights. In contrast to the current paper, however, these benchmarks and tradable
rights are set in terms of Arrovian commodities. Not surprisingly, his results are
largely negative and echo the major message of our work. In particular, he shows
that equilibrium exists only under very restrictive conditions and concludes that the
way that agents are endowed and the institutional framework in which commodities
are traded have a large impact of the possibly that markets can work efficiently in
the presence of externalities. It is especially worth noting that Cres shows that
simply bounding endowments in an Arrovian model is not enough.
We make the following assumptions on Xi and ºi for all i ∈ I:
A1) ºi is complete and transitive
A2) ºi is continuous (the upper and lower contour sets are closed relative to Xi)
A3) if xi ºi x˜i, then for all λ ∈ [0, 1], λxi + (1− λ)x˜i ºi x˜i (weak convexity)
A4) for all xi ∈ Xi, and for all ² ≥ 0 there exists x˜i ∈ Xi such that ‖ xi − x˜i ‖ ≤ ²
and x˜i Âi xi (local nonsatiation).
Each firm f ∈ F is represented by a production set Yf ⊂ <N
c+2Ng+2Nr . A
typical production plan will be written (ycf , y
g
f , y
G
f , y
r
f , y
R
f ) where y
c
f ∈ <N
c
is the
net output bundle of private commodities, ygf ∈ <N
g
is the gross output bundle of
endowment clearly does not gaurantee convexity, it only avoids Starrett’s fundamental nonconvex-
ities.
10 Osana (1962) discusses economically reasonable sufficient conditions for attaining the boundedness
of attainable sets in economies with externalities.
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privately produced public goods, yGf ∈ <N
g
is the input bundle of public goods,
yrf ∈ <N
r
is the input bundle of privately used externality rights, and yRf ∈ <N
r
is
an input bundle which equals the total level of externality rights consumed across
all the agents in the economy.11 As with consumers, firms both benefit from using
up externality rights (yrf ) and are harmed by the total level of rights collectively
used up in the economy (yRf ).
It is important to note that for consumers, xRi is the level of abatement whereas
for firms, yRf is the level of smoke. This has a significant technical implication. It
means that preferences of agents are defined taking the total social endowment of
rights as fixed. Increasing the total social endowment of smoke rights, for example,
would mean that a given level of abatement would leave more smoke in the air,
agents worse off, and marginal rates of substitution between commodities different
in general. Thus, while the rights endowment can be set at any level, the preferences
considered in this model must take this choice as parametric in subsequent analysis.
Also note that firms’ production sets include production of public goods by other
firms. In both cases, this was the most notationally convenient way to deal with
highly general externalities considered in this paper. Neither of these conventions
restricts the model in any way.
We assume for all f ∈ F :
B1) Yf is a nonempty, closed set
B2) for all yf , y˜f ∈ Yf and all λ ∈ [0, 1], λyf + (1− λ)y˜f ∈ Yf (convexity).
See Boyd and Conley (1997) for a demonstration that this convexity assumption is
not inconsistent with externality markets modeled in this way. It must be admitted,
however, that nonfundamental nonconvexities as described by Baumol (1972) are
still possible and therefore, convexity is a much stronger assumption here than in
11 Although yrf is described as a firm’s private use of externality rights, it can also be the firm’s
production of externality rights. In this case we might imagine a firm that specializes in cleaning
up pollution, for example. This interpretation does not affect the model in any way.
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an economy without externalities.
Two complications arise in describing the global production opportunities.
First, firms use public commodities as inputs and hence the global set is not gener-
ally the sum of all the firms’ sets. Second, consumers also contribute to externality
production, and so the global production opportunities must be indexed by the con-
sumers’ aggregate private use of rights. We define the global production set relative
to xr, an arbitrary level of consumers’ private use of externality property rights, as
follows:
Y(xr) ≡
{
y ≡ (yc, yg, yG, yr, yR) ∈ <Nc+2Ng+2Nr
∣∣∣∣
(yc, yg, yG, yr, yR) = (
∑
f
ycf ,
∑
f
ygf ,−
∑
f
ygf ,
∑
f
yrf ,
∑
f
yrf − xr)
and for all f ∈ F , (ycf , ygf , yG, yrf , yR) ∈ Yf
}
.
In words, a global production bundle (relative to a given level of externality rights
used by consumers) consists of an aggregate level of net private commodities pro-
duction, an aggregate level of public goods production, a level of public goods input
which equals the level produced, an aggregate input of externality rights, and the
total level of used rights that must equal the sum of firms’ and consumers’ uses. By
convention, yg is generally positive because it is an output vector, and yG, yr, and
yR are generally negative because they are input vectors.
We make the following additional assumption:
B3) Y(xr) is upper semi-continuous
An allocation is a list a = (x1, . . . , xI , yI+1, . . . , yI+F ). The set of feasible allo-
cations A consists of all allocations a such that
1. for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Xi
2. for all f ∈ F , yf ∈ Yf
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3.
∑
i x
c
i =
∑
i ω
c
i +
∑
f y
c
f
4. for all i ∈ I and all f ∈ F , xGi = −yGf =
∑
k y
g
k
5. for all i ∈ I and all f ∈ F , xRi =
∑
j ω
r
j + y
R
f =
∑
j ω
r
j −
∑
j x
r
j +
∑
k y
r
k.
Conditions one and two require that the allocation be feasible for each consumer
and producer. Condition three requires that the net production of private goods
equals the consumption. Condition four requires that the production of public goods
equals the amount consumed by each consumer, and that each firm experiences the
total public goods production of all firms. Finally, condition five requires that
the total level of externality rights is divided between abatement and externality
uses, and that each firm experiences the total level of externalities generated by
all the consumers and firms while each consumer experiences the resulting level of
abatement.12
The set of Pareto efficient allocations is defined as
PE ≡ {a ∈ A | there is no aˆ ∈ A s.t. xˆi ºi xi for all i ∈ I,
and xˆj Âj xj for some j ∈ I
}
.
The price space is denoted by
Π ≡{
(pc, pG1 , . . , p
G
I , p
G
I+1, . . , p
G
I+F , p
R
1 , . . , p
R
I , p
R
I+1, . . , p
R
I+F ) ∈ <N
c+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr\0
}
.
Note that each private commodity has a common price for all agents whereas public
commodities have personalized prices. Furthermore, prices for the private aspects
of public goods and externality rights have not been explicitly defined because those
prices are derived from the personalized prices of public goods and abatement. That
is, given a price vector p ∈ Π, the individualized price faced by consumer i is
12 In interpreting condition five, recall that by convention xRi and x
R
i are positive because they are
consumption vectors, but yRf and y
r
f are generally negative because they are inputs for firms.
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pi =
(
pc, pGi ,
∑
j∈I
pRj +
∑
k∈F
pRk , p
R
i
)
,
where
∑
j p
R
j +
∑
k p
R
k is the price of externality rights and p
R
i is agent i’s personal-
ized price on abatement. Note that generally, pRj ≥ 0, and pRk ≥ 0, since pRj is the
price a consumer pays for the public good “abatement” while −pRk is compensation
a firm receives for the public bad “smoke”.13 Similarly, the individualized price
faced by firm f is
pf =
(
pc,
∑
j∈I
pGj +
∑
k∈F
pGk , p
G
f ,
∑
j∈I
pRj +
∑
k∈F
pRk , p
R
f
)
.
It will be helpful to denote the common prices on the private aspects of the public
commodities as follows:
pg ≡
∑
j∈I
pGj +
∑
k∈F
pGk and p
r ≡
∑
j∈I
pRj +
∑
k∈F
pRk .
Recall that production possibilities are determined by the aggregate levels of
used externality rights. However, consumers’ utilities depend on the level of unused
rights. To coordinate these two sides of the rights markets, we require firms and
consumers alike to pay according to the aggregate abatement level that is equal to
the total available rights minus the aggregate level of smoke.14 Therefore, firm f
13 If this were not the case, abatement would be a bad and the externality would be positive. While
this would not create difficulties in model, it may not be very interesting to study a positive
externality that can be produced only if rights are purchased at a negative price.
14 Alternatively, we could have made firms’ production possibilities depend on the abatement level.
Formally, however, this would require that the global production set be indexed by the externality
rights endowment, which is less conventional than indexing it by the amount of smoke generated by
consumers, as we have done. Furthermore, note from the definition of profits that, in general, firms
will not desire to shut down and ask that an infinite amount of smoke be produced because yRf
is bounded below by ωr . This implies that there is a bound on the compensation that firms have
available to them in exchange for allowing smoke to be produced. This is how we avoid Starrett’s
fundamental nonconvexities in our model.
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producing yf and facing prices pf and aggregate social rights endowment
∑
i ω
r
i
makes profits of
pif
(
yf , pf ,
∑
i
ωri
)
= pcycf + p
gygf + p
G
f y
G
f + p
ryrf − pRf
(∑
i
ωri + y
R
f
)
.
Let ∆I−1 denote the I − 1 dimensional simplex:
∆I−1 ≡
{
θ ∈ <I
∣∣∣∑
i
θi = 1, and θi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I
}
.
We denote a profit share system for a private ownership economy by θ =
(θI+1, . . . , θI+F ) ∈ ∆I−1 × · · · ×∆I−1 ≡ Θ where θif is interpreted as consumer i’s
share of the profits of firm f .
The budget set of agent i depends on endowments, firm shares, profits, and
prices. Omitting the arguments of the profit functions, this is given by:
Bi(ω, θi, pi, pi) ≡
{
(xci , x
G
i , x
r
i , x
R
i ) ∈ Xi
∣∣∣ pixi ≤ piωi +∑
f
θifpif
}
.
An allocation and price vector (a,p) ∈ A × Π is said to be a competitive
equilibrium relative to endowments ω and profit shares θ ∈ Θ if and only if:
(a) for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Bi(ωi, θi, pi(a,p,
∑
i ω
r
i ), pi) and xi ºi xˆi for all xˆi ∈
Bi(ωi, θi, pi(a,p,
∑
i ω
r
i ), pi);
(b) for all f ∈ F , pif (yf , pf ,
∑
i ω
r
i ) ≥ pif (yˆf , pf ,
∑
i ω
r
i ) for all yˆf ∈ Yf .
We begin by stating a first welfare theorem for this competitive equilibrium.
A second welfare theorem also holds for this model. The proofs for both welfare
theorems are notationally dense. And the method of proof for the second welfare
theorem is very similar to the one used for the existence theorem below. Thus, in
order to not tax the reader unduly, we have omitted these proofs from the current
paper. Complete proofs are available from the authors upon request. We state the
first welfare theorem anyway due to its importance in interpreting our results in
terms of the Coase hypothesis.
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Theorem 1. If (a,p) is a competitive equilibrium then a ∈ PE.
In words, Theorem 1 says that, if transaction costs are zero, market exchanges
of property rights lead to a Pareto efficient outcome. Note that the distribution
of externality property rights is arbitrary and so, although a different efficient al-
location is likely to be reached if the distribution of endowments changes, the fact
that an efficient outcome is reached does not depend on a particular allocation.15
Provided that an equilibrium exists, the first welfare theorem is essentially a Coase
Theorem.
3. Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we turn the question of existence of competitive equilibrium.
Our approach is to construct an associated economy for which we can find a quasi-
equilibrium using Debreu (1962). This method was introduced by Foley (1970)
and developed in more detail by Milleron (1972). We then show that the quasi-
equilibrium of the associated economy corresponds to a competitive equilibrium in
our original economy. It is important to note, however, that the use of Foley’s
technique in this model is not a simple adaptation. We discuss the differences in
more detail below.
We add the following assumptions in order to prove the existence of a compet-
itive equilibrium. For all i ∈ I:
A5) Xi has a lower bound
A6) Xi is closed and convex
15 This theorem is easily extended to include the case in which firms also have endowments of property
rights. See Boyd and Conley (1997).
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A7) (ωci , 0, ω
r
i , 0) ∈ Xi
and for all f, k ∈ F :
B5) (0, 0, yGf , 0, y
R
f ) ∈ Yf whenever there exist yk ∈ Yk for all k 6= f and xi ∈ Xi
for all i ∈ I such that yGf =
∑
k y
g
k and y
R
f =
∑
k y
r
k −
∑
i x
r
i .
B6) for all xr ∈ <Nr , AC (Y(xr)) ∩ <Nc+2Ng+2Nr+ = {0} where AC denotes the
Asymptotic Cone defined as
AC (Y(xr)) ≡
{
b ∈ <Nc+2Ng+2Nr
∣∣∣∣ Y(xr) + λb ∈ Y(xr) for all λ ≥ 0}
Assumption B5 is interpreted as a shut-down possibility. That is, regardless of the
level of ambient smoke or public goods produced by any other firm or consumer,
each firm can always shut down and produce zero output of private commodities
and public goods. Assumption B6 is interpreted as the asymptotic impossibility of
free production for any given level of public inputs.
For each consumer and firm we introduce one artificial commodity for each con-
sumer’s net consumption of public commodities and externalities and one artificial
commodity for each firm’s net production of public commodities and externalities.
For each i ∈ I construct an associated consumption set
X∗i ≡
{
(xˆc, xˆG1 , . . , xˆ
G
I , yˆ
G
I+1, . . , yˆ
G
I+F , xˆ
R
1 , . . , xˆ
R
I , yˆ
R
I+1, . . , yˆ
R
I+F ) ∈ <N
c+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr
∣∣∣
there is an xi ∈ Xi such that
xˆc = xci , xˆ
G
i = x
G
i , xˆ
G
j 6=i = 0, yˆ
G
f = 0 for all f ∈ F ,
xˆRi = x
r
i + x
R
i , xˆ
R
j 6=i = x
r
i , and yˆ
R
f = x
r
i for all f ∈ F
}
.
Each xˆGj and yˆ
G
f are zero because agent i does not contribute to the production
of public goods. In contrast, agent i’s use of externality rights contributes to the
overall level of the public input of abatement and so the definition of each xˆRj and
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yˆRf reflect agents i’s private consumption of rights and corresponding contribution
to abatement.
We now define a function which maps elements of Xi to elements of X∗i . Let
Γi : Xi → X∗i be defined by
Γi(xci , x
G
i , x
r
i , x
R
i ) = (x
c
i ,
I︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . , xGi , ., 0,
F︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, ..0,
I︷ ︸︸ ︷
xri , . . , x
r
i + x
R
i , .., x
r
i ,
F︷ ︸︸ ︷
xri , .., x
r
i ) .
It is easily verified that Γi is linear in the sense that Γi(xi + xˆi) = Γi(xi) + Γi(xˆi)
and Γi(λxi) = λΓi(xi) for all λ ∈ <. The following lemma shows that an element
of Xi corresponds to one and only one element of X∗i .
Lemma 1. For all i ∈ I, Γi : Xi → X∗i is bijective.
Proof/
See the Appendix.
The bijection Γi : Xi → X∗i induces a well-defined preference relation º∗i on
X∗i such that xi ºi x˜i if and only if xi º∗i x˜i where Γi(xi) = xi and Γi(x˜i) = x˜i.
The associated endowment of agent i is ηi = Γi(ωi) = (ωci , 0, . . , 0, ω
r
i , . . , ω
r
i ). It will
be demonstrated below that, given the way each X∗i is defined, the global associated
consumption set is X∗ =
∑
iX
∗
i . The aggregate associated endowment is η =
∑
i ηi.
For each f ∈ F construct an associated production set
Y ∗f ≡
{
(yˆc, xˆG1 , . . , xˆ
G
I , yˆ
G
I+1, . . , yˆ
G
I+F , xˆ
R
1 , . . , xˆ
R
I , yˆ
R
I+1, . . , yˆ
R
I+F ) ∈ <N
c+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr
∣∣∣
there is an yf ∈ Yf such that
yˆc = ycf , xˆ
G
i = y
g
f for all i ∈ I, yˆGk 6=f = ygf , yˆGf = ygf + yGf ,
xˆRi = y
r
f for all i ∈ I, yˆRk 6=f = yrf , and yˆRf = yrf −
∑
i
ωri − yRf
}
.
Note that the definition of each xˆGi and yˆ
G
f reflects the fact that firm f ’s production
of public goods simultaneously affects all consumers and firms who consume that
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good. Similarly, firm f ’s private use of externality rights simultaneously affects the
public level of abatement through each xˆRi and the public level of smoke through
each yˆRk . We demonstrate below that by defining production sets in this way the
associated global production set, Y∗ =
∑
f Y
∗
f , corresponds directly with feasibility
in our original economy. Finally, note that for any price p, firm f ’s profits are
simply pif = p · y∗f for y∗f ∈ Y ∗f .
We now define a function which maps elements of Yf to elements of Y ∗f . Let
Υf : Yf → Y ∗f be defined by
Υf (ycf , y
g
f , y
G
f , y
r
f , y
R
f ) = (y
c
f ,
I︷ ︸︸ ︷
ygf , .., y
g
f ,
F︷ ︸︸ ︷
ygf , .., y
g
f + y
G
f , . . , y
g
f ,
I︷ ︸︸ ︷
yrf , .., y
r
f ,
F︷ ︸︸ ︷
yrf , .., y
r
f −
∑
i
ωri − yRf , . . , yrf ) .
As with Γi, it is easily verified that Υf is affine. The following lemma shows that
an element of Yf corresponds to one and only one element of Y ∗f .
Lemma 2. For all f ∈ F , Υf : Yf → Y ∗f is bijective.
Proof/
See the Appendix.
We have thus defined the associated private ownership economy
E∗ =
{
{X∗i ,º∗i , ηi}i∈I , {Y ∗f }f∈F , θ
}
from our original economy
E =
{
{Xi,ºi, ωi}i∈I , {Yf}f∈F , θ
}
.
An allocation for E∗ is a list a∗ = (x1, . . ,xI,yI+1, . . ,yI+F). Here we state
the definition of a feasible allocation for A∗ and in the next lemma we show that
this definition correctly corresponds with the definition of feasibility in our original
15
economy. The set of feasible allocations A∗ for E∗ consists of all allocations a∗ such
that
1. for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ X∗i
2. for all f ∈ F , yf ∈ Y ∗f
3.
∑
i xi =
∑
f yf +
∑
i ηi.
The following lemma shows that any feasible bundle for E∗ corresponds to one
and only one feasible bundle for E .
Lemma 3. There is a bijection between A and A∗.
Proof/
See the Appendix.
An allocation and price vector (a∗,p) ∈ A∗×Π is said to be a quasi-equilibrium
relative to endowments η and profit shares θ ∈ Θ if and only if:
(α) for all i ∈ I, p · x∗i ≤ p · ηi +
∑
f θifp · y∗f and either x∗i º∗i xi for all
xi ∈
{
xˆi ∈ X∗i
∣∣∣∣p · xˆi ≤ p · ηi +∑
f
θip · y∗f
}
or
p · x∗i = p · ηi +
∑
f
θifp · y∗f = min {p · xi | xi ∈ X∗i }.
(β) for all f ∈ F , p · y∗f ≥ p · yf for all yf ∈ Y ∗f
We are now prepared to prove that there exists a quasi-equilibrium of the
associated economy. We prove this theorem by demonstrating that our assumptions
on the original economy imply that Debreu’s (1962) conditions for existence of a
quasi–equilibrium are satisfied for E∗.
Theorem 2. There exists a quasi-equilibrium of E∗.
Proof/
16
See the Appendix.
Note that we could also define a quasi-equilibrium of E in the appropriate way
and then prove that the quasi-equilibrium of E∗ corresponds directly to a quasi-
equilibrium of E . As we are not particularly interested in the quasi-equilibrium, we
state but do not prove the following corollary but we prove a parallel result later to
show that the equilibrium of E∗ corresponds to a competitive equilibrium of E .
We introduce the following additional assumptions to show that the quasi-
equilibrium of E∗ is also an equilibrium of E∗:
A8) for all i ∈ I and for all p ∈ Π, there exists xi ∈ Xi such that pixi < piωi (there
are cheaper points)
Theorem 3. There exists an equilibrium of E∗.
Proof/
See the Appendix.
It only remains to be shown that the equilibrium of E∗ corresponds to a com-
petitive equilibrium of our original economy, E .
Theorem 4. There exists a competitive equilibrium of E .
Proof/
See the Appendix.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. For all i ∈ I, Γi : Xi → X∗i is bijective.
Proof/
a. First note that X∗i is the image of Xi under Γi. This immediately implies that
Γi is surjective.
b. Next we show that Γi is injective. Choose xi, x¯i ∈ Xi such that Γi(xi) = Γi(x¯i).
Expanding this we get
Γi(xi) = (xci , 0, . . , x
G
i , . . , 0, x
r
i , . . , x
r
i + x
R
i , . . , x
r
i ) =
Γi(x¯i) = (x¯ci , 0, . . , x¯
G
i , . . , 0, x¯
r
i , . . , x¯
r
i + x¯
R
i , . . , x¯
r
i )
which holds if and only if term by term equality holds. Therefore, xci = x¯
c
i ,
xGi = x¯
G
i , x
r
i = x¯
r
i , x
R
i = x¯
R
i and so we finally have that xi = x¯i. This shows
that Γi is injective. ¤
Lemma 2. For all f ∈ F , Υf : Yf → Y ∗f is bijective.
Proof/
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a. First note that Y ∗f is the image of Yf under Υf . This immediately implies that
Υf is surjective.
b. Next we show that Υf is injective. Choose yf , y¯f ∈ Yf such that Υf (yf ) =
Υf (y¯f ). Expanding this we get
(ycf , y
g
f , . . , y
g
f + y
G
f , . . , y
g
f , y
r
f , . . , y
r
f −
∑
i
ωri − yRf , . . , yrf ) =
(y¯cf , y¯
g
f , . . , y¯
g
f + y¯
G
f , . . , y¯
g
f , y¯
r
f , . . , y¯
r
f −
∑
i
ωri − yRf , . . , yrf )
which holds if and only if term by term equality holds. Therefore, ycf = y¯
c
f ,
ygf = y¯
g
f , y
G
f = y¯
G
f , y
r
f = y¯
r
f , y
R
f = y¯
R
f and so we finally have that yf = y¯f . This
shows that Υf is injective. ¤
Lemma 3. There is a bijection between A and A∗.
Proof/
We need to show that a = (x1, . . , xI , yI+1, . . , yI+F ) ∈ A if and only if
a∗ =
(
Γ1(x1), . . ,ΓI(xI),ΥI+1(yI+1), . . ,ΥI+F
)
∈ A∗.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, it is clear that a satisfies conditions one and two of the definition
of A if and only if a∗ satisfies conditions one and two of the definition of A∗. It only
remains to be shown that conditions three, four, and five of the definition of A hold
if and only if ∑
i
Γi(xi) =
∑
f
Υf (yf ) +
∑
i
Γi(ωi).
Subtracting the endowment from both sides and expanding this gives
(∑
i
xci −
∑
i
ωci , x
G
1 , . . , x
G
I , 0, . . , 0,
∑
i
xri + x
R
i −
∑
i
ωri , . . ,
∑
i
xr + xRI −
∑
i
ωri ,
∑
i
xri −
∑
i
ωri , . . ,
∑
i
xri −
∑
i
ωri
)
=
(∑
f
ycf ,
∑
f
ygf , . . ,
∑
f
ygf ,
∑
f
ygf + y
G
I+1, . . ,
∑
f
ygf + y
G
I+F ,
∑
f
yrf , . . ,
∑
f
yrf ,
∑
f
yrf −
∑
i
ωri − yRI+1, . . ,
∑
f
yrf −
∑
i
ωri − yRI+F
)
.
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This is true if and only if term by term equality holds, that is,∑
i
xci −
∑
i
ωci =
∑
f
ycf ,
xGi = −yGf =
∑
k
ygk for all i ∈ I and for all f ∈ F ,∑
j
xrj − xRi −
∑
j
ωrj =
∑
k
yrk for all i ∈ I and,
∑
j
xrj −
∑
j
ωrj =
∑
k
yrk −
∑
j
ωrj − yRf for all f ∈ F .
These are precisely conditions three, four, and five of the definition of A. ¤
Theorem 2. There exists a quasi-equilibrium of E∗.
Proof/
To prove this result, we carefully state each assumption of Debreu’s (1962) theorem
in the context of our model. We then prove that each of these assumptions hold for
E∗.
(a.1) AC(X∗) ∩ −AC(X∗) = {0}.
This result follows from AC(X∗) ⊂ <Nc+Ng+2Nr+ which follows trivially from
the fact that, for any nonempty convex set C ∈ <N which is bounded below,
AC(C) ⊂ <N+ .
(a.2) For every i ∈ I, X∗i is closed and convex.
First write Xi = Xci × XGi × Xri × XRi ⊂ <N
c+Ng+2Nr . Note that since
Xi is closed that Xci , X
G
i , X
r
i , and X
R
i are closed. Then since AC(Xi) ⊂
<Nc+Ng+2Nr+ by (b) above, by Debreu (1959) Proposition 1.9(7) we know that
AC(Xci ) ⊂ <N
c
+ , AC(X
G
i ) ⊂ <N
G
+ , AC(X
r
i ), AC(X
R
i ) ⊂ <N
r
+ . It follows im-
mediately that AC(Xri )∩−AC(XRi ) = 0 which implies that Xri +XRi is closed
by Debreu (1959) Proposition 1.9(9). Finally, X∗i is closed because it is the
product of closed sets. Next, recall that Γi : Xi → X∗i is an affine bijection.
Thus it is routine to verify that each X∗i is convex given that each Xi is.
Let agent i’s feasible consumption set of the associated economy be defined as
X¯∗i (A
∗) ≡
{
x∗i ∈ X∗i | there exists a∗ ∈ A∗ s.t. a∗ = (x∗1, . . , x∗i , . . , x∗I , y∗I+1, . . , y∗I+F )
}
and similarly define X¯i(A).
(b.1) For every x¯i ∈ X¯∗i , there is a xi ∈ X∗i such that xi Â∗i x¯i.
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Local nonsatiation implies that for all x¯i ∈ X¯i there exists a xi ∈ Xi such that
xi Âi x¯i. But Γi(xi) ∈ X∗i and Γi(x¯i) ∈ X¯∗i by Debreu’s Lemma 6. Finally,
Γi(xi) Â∗i Γi(x¯i) because Γi preserves order.
(b.2) For every x′i ∈ X∗i , the sets {xi ∈ X∗i |xi ºi x′i} and {xi ∈ X∗i |x′i ºi xi} are
closed in X∗i .
This follows directly from Lemma 3 and assumption A1).
(b.3) For every x′i ∈ X∗i , the set {xi ∈ X∗i |xi ºi x′i} is convex.
This follows directly from Lemma 3 and assumption A3).
(c.1) (η + Y ∗) ∩X∗ 6= ∅.
Since 0 ∈ Y ∗ we have that η ∈ (η + Y ∗). And η ∈ X∗ by the fact that
(wci , 0, w
r
i , 0) ∈ Xi for all i ∈ I. Therefore, η ∈ (η + Y ∗) ∩X∗.
(c.2) If D is the smallest cone containing points
∑
i(xi − ηi) where xi is strictly
maximal on X¯∗i for all i ∈ I then (ηi + closure(Y ∗)−D) ∩X∗i 6= ∅.
It is easily verified that A∗ is compact and, therefore, X¯∗i is compact. So if
A∗ is nonempty and since º∗i is continuous, X¯∗i has a maximal element, xi.
Then since 0 ∈ D we only need to show that ηi ∈ (ηi+ closure(Y ∗)−D)∩X∗i .
Furthermore, closure(Y ∗)+η = closure(Y ∗+η) and since X∗ is closed by (a.2)
above, we know that closure(Y ∗+η)∩X∗ = closure[(Y ∗+η)∩X∗]. Therefore,
the claim reduces to showing that (Y ∗ + η) ∩X∗ is closed.
Now consider the set Y¨ (xr) defined as follows:
Y¨ (xr) ≡
{
(zc, zg, . . , zg, 0, . . , 0, zr, . . , zr, zR, . . , zR) ∈ <Nc+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr
∣∣∣
(zc −
∑
i
ωci , z
g,−zg, zr −
∑
i
ωri , z
R −
∑
i
ωri ) ∈ Y(xr)
}
.
Note that since Y(xr) is closed for all xr and is upper semi-continuous, then
Y¨ (xr) is also closed and upper semi-continuous. Now consider the coordinate
projection Ψ : X∗ → <Nc+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr defined as follows:
Ψ(xˆc, xˆG1 , . . , xˆ
G
I , yˆ
G
I+1, . . , yˆ
G
I+F , xˆ
R
1 , . . , xˆ
R
I , yˆ
R
I+1, . . , yˆ
R
I+F ) =
(0, 0, . . , 0, 0, . . , 0, 0, . . , 0, 0, . . , yˆRF )
and note that Ψ is continuous. Then by Debreu (1959) Proposition 1.8(2),
Y¨ ◦Ψ is also upper semi-continuous. Then by construction
∀x ∈ X∗ ∩ (Y ∗ + η), x ∈ Y¨ (Ψ(x)) (∗)
and ∀x ∈ X∗, Y¨ (Ψ(x)) ⊂ Y ∗ + η. (∗∗)
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By (d.2), we know that AC(X∗) ∩AC(Y ∗) = {0}. By Debreu (1959) Proposi-
tion 1.9(8) we therefore know that X∗ ∩ (Y ∗+ η) bounded. Then the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem tells us that every sequence in X∗ ∩ (Y ∗ + η) has a con-
vergent subsequence. Let {zk} be a convergent sequence in X∗ ∩ (Y ∗ + η) and
suppose that it converges to z0. Since X∗ is closed, it must be the case that
z0 ∈ X∗. We need to show that z0 ∈ Y ∗ + η in order to prove the claim. By
(∗) above, we know that each zk ∈ Y¨ (Ψ(zk)) and by upper semi-continuity of
Y¨ ◦Ψ, z0 ∈ Y¨ (Ψ(z0)). By (∗∗), z0 ∈ X∗ implies that z0 ∈ Y ∗ + η.
(d.1) for all f ∈ F , 0 ∈ Y ∗f
This follows directly from (0, 0, 0, 0,−∑i ωri ) ∈ Yf for all f ∈ F .
(d.2) AC(X∗) ∩ AC(Y ∗) = {0}.
By assumption (B6) we know AC(Y (xr)) ∩ <Nc+2Ng+2Nr+ = {0}. Therefore
AC(Y ∗)∩<Nc+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr+ = {0}. By (a.1) above we know thatAC(X∗) ⊂
<Nc+(I+F )Ng+(I+F )Nr+ . Therefore AC(X∗) ∩ AC(Y ∗) = {0}.
Under the above conditions Debreu’s (1962) conditions for a quasi-equilibrium of
E∗ hold, and therefore the theorem is proven. ¤
Theorem 3. There exists an equilibrium of E∗.
Proof/
By the previous theorem there exists a quasi-equilibrium of E∗. Then by as-
sumption (B8), all consumers have positive wealth. Therefore, the quasi-equilibrium
is also an equilibrium. ¤
Theorem 4. There exists a competitive equilibrium of E .
Proof/
Let (a∗,p) where a∗ = (x1, . . ,xI ,yI+1, . . ,yI+F ) be an equilibrium for E∗.
Now let
a = (Γ−11 (x1), . . ,Γ
−1
I (xI),Υ
−1
I+1(yI+1), . . ,Υ
−1
I+F (yI+F )) = (x1, . . , xI , yI+1, . . , yI+F ).
Notice that p · xi = pi ·xi = pcxci+pGi +prxri +pRi xRi so (α) implies that Γ−1i (xi) for
each i ∈ I satisfies part (a) of the definition of a competitive equilibrium. Similarly,
since pif = p · yf = pf · yf , (β) implies that Υ−1f (yf ) for each f ∈ F satisfies part
(b). And finally, by Lemma (6), feasibility of a∗ implies feasibility of a. Therefore,
(a,p) is a competitive equilibrium of E . ¤
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